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APPLYING THE RESERVED RIGHTS DOCTRINE IN
RIPARIAN STATES
ANITA PORTE ROBB*
In the United States. there are two doctrines for regulating the water
rights of private individuals and state agencies.' The seventeen western
states2 use the prior appropriation system which, as the name suggests.
is an adaptation of the maxim "prior in time is prior in right."'  Most of
the remaining states4 follow the common law doctrine of riparian water
rights.' This doctrine gives owners of land along stream banks or bod-
Member. Msi.ourt Bar. B A.. Univcrsitv of Missouri. J.D.. Unisersatv of Michtean The
author practice% %, th the Ilouston law firm of Vinson & Elkins.
I Trhere are man, %ariations of these two basic doctrines, even among neighboring statcs
adhering to the same stCm. See J. CRINIFI.T. PIN( IPLIS Ot riti. L. ol PROmi Ri ) 21)8 (1962)
and note 5 inlra This simplification into two doctrines is derived from the United States" hsic
east-ues disiion .ee' J Criuit 7. Supra. at 298. These two doctrines apply onl. to natural vaicr
couir ,es. but m.a% also Affiect ground water Id
2 Ihc 17 states are Ariwona. California. Colorado. Idaho. Kansas. Montana. Ncbr.ika.
Nc ,ada. Ne Memco. North Dakota. Oklahoma. Oregon. South Dakota. Texa. Utah. Wahine-
ton. and Womnag See 43 U.S C § 391 (1976),
3 0 Bito oi iR. R. tUNNINGIIANI. J. JILIN & A. S.NT1t. BASK PROiM RiN L.w 190 3d ed
1979) i'h doctrine of prior appropriation originated during the California gold rush rhe cus-
toni arose that the first to stake out a claim had a right against subsequent claimants to both the
,daim and ito the %%ater suppl. needed to work the claim.
The Supreme Court of California realized that the development of a ne% ssstent of waler la%%
%4as nccssar,,. sintc the gold miners were trespassers having no interest in the land. The court
t.oncludcd that the customs of the miners should be honored by the law. Irwin %. Phillips. 5 (al
140 118551
'Ihe prior appropriation doctrine was soon extended to cover appropriations for purposes other
than gold mining See Rupley v. Welch. 23 Cal. 453 (1863) (upholding appropriations for purpose
o irrinaiLon). tartar v. Spring Creck Water & Mining Co.. 5 Cal. 396 (1855) (appropriation doc-
trinc cxtcndcd to usage for power) For more on the deelopmcni of the appropriation doctrine
see generally J Ciiuuhr.u pru note I. at 299-.5 R. POWI.Lt., Tiii. l.-w oi RiAL PROi'PIAI § 734
(1979)
Approval of these customs by the United States was not long in coming. In 1866. the United
States formalls recognized these customs in a federal mining statute. Id. The Desert l.and Act of
I.77 severed Uater from land in the public domain. This meant that water rights could be ac-
quired separatel., from rights in appurtenant land. Unappropriated nonnavigable waters were
free for appropriation in accordance with the local laws of the lands now constituting the states of
Ari/ona. California. Colorado. Idaho. Montana. Nevada. New Mexico. North Dakota. South Da-
kota. Utah. Washington. and Wyoming. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-323 (1976). For the Supreme
Court's construction of the Desert Land Act. see California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co.. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
4 This article concerns itself only with the 48 continental states.
5 )istinct from the riparian doctrine of reasonable use is the English rule of natural Ilou.
%which gives land owners the right to have water flow past their lands undiminished in quantity
and unimpaired in quality. For discussion of the natural flow doctrine's origins and application
1
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ies of water' the right to reasonable use of these waters, and a correla-
tive right protecting against any unreasonable use by other riparians
which significantly diminishes the quantity or quality of water.7
There is a different method for determining the water rights of the
federal government on land reserved for federal use.8 This method is
known as the reserved rights doctrine. Under this doctrine, when the
federal government reserves land it implicitly reserves the right to di-
vert as much water as is necessary to meet the needs of the land.'
In western states, courts have determined that federal lands should
receive water under the reserved rights doctrine rather than under the
see C MEytRS & A. TARLIX'K. WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENr 53-54 (1971); 5 R. Posi ItL.
supra note 3. § 711. See also notes 13-14 in/'ra and accompanying text.
Light of the appropriation states claim that the common law doctrine of riparian rights has
never been a part of their law. These states are Arizona. Colorado. Idaho. Montana. Nevada.
New Mexico. Utah. and Wyoming. See 5 R. POWELL. supra note 3. § 734. at 445-46. For cases
repudiating the riparian nghts docinne. see e.g.. Schodde v. Twin Falls Light & Water Co.. 224
U.S. 107 (1912) (involving the water law of Idaho). Mettler v. Ames Realty Co.. 61 Mont. I.2. 201
P. 702 (1921).
Nine states follow the California doctrine, a dual system of riparian and appropration water
rights These states view a grant of public land as giving the patentee riparian rights. These rights
are superior to subsequent appropriations, and infenor only to appropriations made while the
land was publically owned. The nine states are California. Kansas. Nebraska. North Dakota.
Oklahoma. Oregon. South Dakota. Texas. and Washington. For additional discussion of the
California doctrine see. 5 R. POWELL. .rpra note 3. § 734. at 445. For cases illustrating the accept-
ance of this dual doctrine, see. e.g.. Plait v. Rapid City. 67 S.D. 245. 291 N.W. 600 (1940). Clark v
Allaman. 71 Kan. 206. 80 P. 57 (1905): Crawford Co. v. Hathaway. 67 Neb. 325. 93 N.W. 781
(1903)
This article will not use "riparian" in the general sense of that term: rather, it will use the term
to describe the Amencan doctrine of pure reasonable use.
6. The term riparian is sometimes wrongly used to refer to the shores of seas or tidal lakes
which do not have the character of a watercourse. The proper term in these contexts is"littoral."
See BLA K'S LAW DICTIONARY 842 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
7 See general/.- RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 851-854 (1939): 5 R. POWELL. sprai note 3.
712-718 For discussion of standards courts have used in applying this flexible reasonableness
standard, see in/re notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
I. Reserved lands are not the same thing as public lands which are subject to pnvate owner-
ship under public land laws such as the Hlomestead Act of 1862. A clear distinction between
"public lands" and "reservations" is given in 16 U.S.C. § 796(l). (2) (1982):
(i1 "public lands" means such lands and interests in lands owned by the United States as
are subject to private appropriation and disposal under public land laws. It shall not
include "reservations" as hereinafter defined;
(2) "reservations" means natural forests, tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations.
military reservations, and other lands and interests in lands owned by the United States
and withdrawn, reserved, or withheld from private appropriation and disposal under the
public land laws; also lands and interests in lands acquired and held for any public
purposes ....
9. Much has been written regarding the origins and development of the reserved rights doc-
trine. See. e.g.. F. TRELEASE. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 104-74 (1971); I.C.
WIIEATLEY. C. CORKER. T. STETSON & D. REED. STUDY OF TilE DEVELOPMENT. MANAGEMENT.
AND USE OF WATER RESOURCES ON TitE PUBLIC LANDS 80-199 (1969); Ranquist. The Winters
Doctrine andflow /I Grew.-" Federal Reservation of Rights to the Use of Wafer. 1975 B. YV. L_
REV. 639. See also notes 27.42 infra and accompanying text.
2
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state water systems of prior appropriation."' Accordingly. the two sys-
tems have been made compatible so that they can harmoniously co-
exist in the same states.I ' Due possibly to the smaller amount of feder-
ally reserved lands in riparian states, " the question of whether the re-
served rights doctrine should apply in states adhering to a riparian
rights system has not been addressed.
This article suggests that the reserved rights doctrine should apply in
riparian states. Section I discusses the development and operation of
these two doctrines. Section I1 then considers whether reserved rights
should be applied in riparian states, and concludes that the application
would be justified. Finally. Section III confronts the problems that
would arise in making these two systems compatible, and submits pro-
posals for their resolution.
1. Tilt- RIPARIAN ANi) RESI:RVED Rlicrrs DoCTRINES
A. The Riparian Righis Doctrine
Rapid industrialization in the eastern states and intense competition
for the available water supply made water too precious to justify
America's continued adherence to England's riparian doctrine of
natural flow." Thus. in the late nineteenth century. most of the eastern
states adopted the American rule of reasonable use." The American
10 .Se ,'. United States v New Mexico. 438 U.S. 696 t 19781. Cappaert , United State..
421 1 S 12N 119-6). .rtona% ('ahlornia. 373 U S. 546 (163. Winters ' United St.ites. 207 U S
M'4 ul9OIq;t
II Seege..neralli .Meser,. 'he oahrado Rirer. 19 Si-,. L. Ri v. 1. 65-73 (196). The two
doctrine% ha.e been made ompatible in ltur ways First. the priority date for fIederal rse.,ration,
i, the date on %%hich the federal lands were rescersd Private appropriation.% made before that date
,rc supcror. %4hile later appropriation. are subordinate. . e'e Arizona v. California. 376 U.S 340
l1'1;N4) Second. rteered rghts. unlike %tate created appropriative rights, do not depend on the
.tclual diverion of aler. See. the Arizona v California Master's Repor at 257 The third rule.
an elaboration of the sccond. i that federal reerved rights are not subject to state la.s Thr right
doe, not depend on filine or recording the claim with the state water agency. and it is not subject
to sttte law.% or tit'lcturc and abandonment Id at 261-62. Finally. the quantit. of water re-
-ered b% the go,.crnnicnt is the amount necc.sarv Io fulfill the purpose of the reservation In
4'n--na. for example, this amount suas held to be the amount of water necessar% to irrigate all
,rrivable land on an Indian reservation.
12. The federal government has reserved 414.725.000 acres of land in the continental United
States. some in each state. Of this. over ninety percent. or 374.702.000 acres. hes in the sesenteen
prior appropriation states. The amount of reserved land in riparian states 3s onl% 40.023.000 acres.
U S. )I P7. Of (.OIM1.t L-BURI:AU Of 7I11 CNSUS. STATISrICAL AS i kk T OiT". UTm NITI)
SAIL.s 225 (102d ed. 1981).
13 5 R. POW.LL.ruipra note 3. § 712. at 362-63.
14 Id The states of Georgia. New Jersey. Pennsylvania. and West Virginia still adhere to
the English rule. and Maine. Misoun. Mississippi. and South Dakota have followed it on occa-
sion See. 4%g.. McCausland v. Jarrell. 136 W. Va. 569. 68 S.E.2d 729 (1951): Blanchard v. Baker.
h Me. 253 (1832). Sayles v. City of Mitchell. 66 S.). 592. 245 N.W. 390 (1932): Exton v. Glen
Gardner Water Co.. 3 N.J. Misc. 613. 129 A. 255 11925): Palmer Water Co. v. Lehighton Water
Supply Co. 280 Pa. 492. 124 A. 747 (1924). GA. COD! AN.. § 105 (1956): Mss. Cot)t. ANN.
§ 5956-01 (Supp. 1966). See also Agnor. Riparian Righit in Gergia. 18 GA. I.a. 401 (1956): Note.
3
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rule modified the natural flow doctrine by allowing the separate trans-
fer of riparian fights and the use of water on nonriparian land, as long
as a riparian owner cannot show actual damage.' 5 However, the Amer-
ican rule resembles the English rule in that the property right in ripa-
rian waters is tied to the land.' 6 This means that water generally can be
used only by owners of the land along the water source."' In addition,
American riparian fights are vested fights and are neither acquired by
use nor lost by disuse."' In times of shortage, all riparian users share
the available water pro rata. t
The permissiveness of a riparian's use is determined by applying the
standard of reasonableness.-" The main categories of reasonableness
that courts use2 ' are reasonableness of purpose,-2 2 of destination,2 - of
The l.as of.Varigable Sireams m West Virginia. 39 W. VA. L. Rv. 73 (1956-195.7): Note. 2b M Iss
LJ 106 (1954)
15 5 R. P014EiLL. supra note 3. § 712. at 364-66. Under the English natural flow approach.
selling or transferring riparian rights apart from the land or the water's use on nonrioanan land i
never privileged See Roberts v. Martin. 72 W. Va. 92. 77 S.E. 535 (1913) and'Ormerod v
Todmorden Mill Co.. I I Q.B.D. 155 (1883). both proscribing the transfer of riparian water sepa.
rate from the land. See also Atwood v. Llay Main College. I Ch. 444 (1926) (use of %titer on
nonnparian land is unprivileged). For two cases illustrating the modified American rule. see
Humphreys Meria Oil Co. v. Arseneaux. 116 Tex. 603. 297 S.W. 225 (1927): Jones v. Portsmouth
Aqueduct. 62 NIf 488 (1883).
lb This propeny right is temporary and usufructuar, in nature. The riparian owner does
not osn the %ater itself, but may only use it as it flows by the land. See C. Mt-YI.ks & A
TARLC. K. juLpra note 4. at 52.
This peculiar characteristic of the property right in riparian water is the basis for the *nasnga-
lion ser'itudc." which allows the government to destroy without compensation certain private
uses of water in navigable streams. The common justification for the navigation servitude is that
running water is incapable of private ownership. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. The
riparian view that water rights are tied to the land differs from the prior appropriation doctrine.
which determines rights in water irrespective of rights in land. See supra note 3.
17 For the exceptions to this rule. see supra note 15.
I See. e.g.. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.. 295 U.S. 142
(19351. United States v Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.. 174 U.S. 690 (1899). By contrast.
actual diversion and use of water is essential to maintain an appropriative claim. See. e.g.. Colo-
rado River Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mt. Power Co.. 158 Colo. 331. 406 P.2d 798 (1965) (ap-
propriation of a minimum flow of a stream to be left in the stream to support fish life held invalid.
since actual diversion is essential to an appropriation).
19. PLBLIL LAw REVIEw COMMISSION. ONE TIuRD OF TIlE NATION'S LAND 142 n.3 (1970)
Ihereinafter cited as N4TION'S LANDI. Appropriation states follow a different procedure in times
of shortage. Appropriators receive water ahead of all water rights acquired at later dates, and the
earlier appropriations must be satisfied in full before later appropriators can receive any water.
See W. HUTCINS. SELECTED PROBLEMS IN TilE LAW OF WATER RtwiTs IN THE WEST 313. 327
(1942). Rut see Salina Creek Irrigation Co. v. State Engineer. 13 Utah 2d 335. 374 P.2d 24 (1962)
(maximum rights of prior appropriators cannot be satisfied until minimum rights of all subsequent
appropriators are satisfied).
20. The reasonableness standard was in use by the 1880"s. See Red River Roller Mills v.
Wright. 30 Minn. 249. 253-54. 15 N.W. 167. 169 (1883).
21. For other miscellaneous categories of reasonableness, see 5 R. POWLLL. supra note 3.
§ 718. See also notes 44.47 infra and accompanying text.
22. To satisfy the test of reasonableness, the purpose must be lawful and beneficial to the
taker. See 5 R. POWE.LL upra note 3. § 713. For a case finding reasonableness of purpose see
4
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quantity.2 4 of pollution 2 " and of alterations in the manner of a stream'!
flow. 2
B. The Reserved Rights Doctrine
The reserved rights doctrine was first enunciated in Winters r" Unied
States.2'7 which enforced the reserved water right for federal Indian res-
ervations. In Arizona v. California,2' the United States Supreme Court
extended the doctrine to non-Indian reserved federal lands.2" Later.
Cappaert r United States "' applied reserved rights to groundwater."
Seneca Consol. Gold Mines Co. v. Great W. Power Co.. 209 Cal. 206. 287 P 93 tl30) (1Aater to
operate a mill as a reasonable purpos).
In some instances courts have refused to find a reasonable purpoe. See. eg . Chatfield % Wi.
son. 31 Vt. 358 (1858) (us harming the plaintiff for spite held not to be a reasonable purpoe).
Sturtevant %. Ford. 281) Mass 303. 182 N.E 560 (1932) (use without a demonstrable bencit to the
taker and harmful to the plaintiff cannot have a reasonable purpose).
23. Decisions ma, depend on whether the water will be used on riparian land For clab'ora.
tion of this standard. .ee Ri ST-milh.su.Ns OI Toa) is § 843 comments c. f. it 1039). 5 R Plt, a I.
supra note 3. at 714.
24. The problem here is determining each user's "fair share." See. ,' i . Joerger % Mount
Shasta Pover Co.. 214 Cal. 630. 7 P.2d 706 (1932). Ilaif s Uin BaN Co. v Coell. 173 Cal 543.
1() P 675 (1916). For general discussion of reasonable quantin of usc see 5 R Pov.i Ii. il/lira
note 3. § 715 This article develops a standard for determining reasonable quantit% on federal
re.ervations. S'e inra notes 61-79 and accompaning text
25. Many circumstances are considered in determining whether a use meets this test .S'e 5
R PI)WI.LL. supra note 3. § 716.
26 A stream's flow can be altered b- detentions, constructions, backups. and increased ra-
pidit) of current Set' 5 R. Pow LL..supra note 3. § 717.
27. 207 U S. 564 (1908). The other major case in the early 1900"., invoing w.ater rights for
federally owned Indian reservations as United States v Conrad lnv Co.. 156 F. 123 tC..) Mont
1907). uI-d 161 F 829 (9th Cir. 1908).
The 0'rnierr court relied on two prior cases. The first was Untred States v. Rio Grandc )an &
Ilrr. Co.. 174 U S 69) (1899). which prohibited states from destroying the reserved water rights of
the United Staes The second case. United States v. Winans. 198 US. 371 (1905). based the
enforcement of the reservation doctrine on the power of the United States to enter into and en-
force treaties. See U.S CO.CST an. i. § 2. cl 2. (The President "shall have Power. b, and 'Alth
the Advice and Consent of the Senate. to make Treaties. provided two thirds of the Scnator,
present concur . ."I
While reliance on the treaty making power as a justification for enforcing resersed rights ha,%
been infrequent, some couns still refer to it on occasion. See. e.g.. United States v. Adair. 478 F
Supp. 336 (D Or. 1979). This article, however, will focus on the more commonly given justifica-
tions for the reserved rights doctrine. See infra note 34-42 and accompanying text.
28 373 U.S. 546 (1963). The Supreme Court's only reserved rights decision between 5tlaterr
and .4rizona was United States v. Powers. 305 U.S. 527 (1939). which followed the tli'nterf
doctrine.
29. In the Arizona decision the right to reserved water was recognized for Lake Mead Na-
tional Recreation Area. lavasu Lake Wildlife Refuge. Imperial National Wildlife Refuge. and
Gala National Forest. Until this opinion, there was disagreement over whether the reservation
doctrine was "a special quirk of Indian water law." Treleasc. Federal Reserved If tier Rilhis Since
PI.LRC. 54 DE-. L.J. 473. 475 (1977). The speculation was increased by the Court's apparent
expansion of the reserved rights doctrine in FPC v. Oregon. 349 U S. 435 (1955) (federal govern-
ment has the right under the property clause to license a dam built on reserved land. without state
concurrence). The Ari-ona decision finally ended the debate eight years after FP( . Oregon.
30. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
5
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I he Court's most recent reserved rights decision. United States v. New
Me.ricor ." examined the scope of reserved water rights and held that
reserved water is available only to the extent it is needed to accomplish
the original purpose of the land's withdrawal."
The Supreme Court has offered two justifications for imposing re-
served rights.' First, the commerce clause." the source of federal
power over navigable waters. 36 authorizes Congress to impair or ac-
quire private water rights without compensation." With the modern
31 In Cappaert. the removal of underground water for agricultural purposes was limited
because the pumping was decreasing the water level of a pool in Dcvii's llole National Monu-
ment. thus threatening an endangered species of fish. The Court justified its decision by pointing
out the close cyclical relationship between groundwater and surface water. For an explanation of
this interrelationship. %ce I WAT.R ANt) WATER RIGITS § 2.4 (R. Clark ed. 1467).
32 438 U S. 696 11978).
33 The issue in Nei..IMetico was what quantity of water the United States had reserved in
creating national forests The Court decided that water was reserved only to accomplish the pur-
pose of the forest, which was only -to preserve the timber or to secure favorable water flows " Id
at 71N
34 While the justifications for imposing reserved rights have been given in case% dealing I tuh
the , .iter loy, of appropriation states, these justifications .re equall useful in justifing the exer-
Li,,e of resersed rights in riparian states
A third justification. the treat% making power. has also ben oftfred. See supra note 27 A
Iourth possible authorization for reserved water rights is found in the general sselfare clause See
LU S Cosi an I. § 8. cI. I ("The Congress shall have Power to... provide for the . . general
Welfare of the United States. . "' This clause was relied on in Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v
McCracken. 357 U S. 275 (1Y58). which upheld the power of Congress to acquire water for federal
lands in the absence of competing state powers.
The necessary and proper clause has been suggested as a fifth source of Congress" power to
acquire water rights for reserved lands. See U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8. cl. 18 (granting Congress
power to **make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution .
Poer,, vested b% this Constitution in the Government ofthe United States .... ) The Court has
% iewed this clause as authorizing Congress to acquire property in the exercise of another constitu-
tional power See. ,Xg. United States v Gettysburg Elec. Ry.. 160 U.S. 668 (1896) (condemnation
of (;cttysburg battlefield).
The latter three rationales for the exercise of the reserved rights powers have been explored onl)
in a fc,% isolatcd instances, and for this reason will not be further dealt with in this article.
35 U.S COST art I. § 8. cl 3 (Congress shall have power "To regulate Commerce
among the several States.
36. Commerce was first held to comprehend navigation in Gibbons v. Ogden. 22 U.S. (9
Wheat) 1(1824).
37. This is known as the federal navigation servitude. See generallir 5 R. PoWE.LL. supra note
3. § 723.1. The navigation servitude is the right of the federal government under the commerce
clause to compel the removal of any obstruction to navigation without paying "just compensa-
tion- as ordinarily required by the fifth amendment. Id For further analysis of the doctrine, see
Morrcale. Federal Pokr, in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule ofVo ('ompensa.
tion. 3 NAT. RES. J. 1 (1963): Note. Effect of ihe Navigation Servitude on Land Reclamation. 2
Coi.u .. J.L. & Six. PRos. 75 (1966).
The scope of the servitude was interpreted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Rands. 389
U S 121 (1967) (barring compensation for the value of land as a port site when riparian land is
taken by the federal government). The major problem with the navigation servitude is that its
broad construction constitutes a serious cloud upon the title of many pieces of real property near
water. Whenever the servitude could conceivably be held applicable by the courts, attorneys and
title companies refuse to certify marketable titles. This seriously impedes the development of
areas affected by the servitude. See 5 R. POWELL supra note 3. § 723. 1.
6
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extension of the scope of the commerce clause. Congress* power to reg-
ulate commerce on waterways has become extremely broad. Regula-
tions under the commerce clause have been upheld when the navigable
capacity of a waterway is affected,' when interstate commerce is af-
fected." or when the regulation is imposed for a valid noncommercial
reason.
The second source of power for reserved water rights is the Constitu-
tion's property clause." Under this clause. Congress is given unlimited
authority to regulate the use of federal lands, including the power to
acquire the water necessary to the beneficial use of these lands."-
II. Tmi. QUESTION OF APPLYING RESERVIA)
RIGHTS IN RIPARIAN STATES
It is unclear whether the Supreme Court has ever intended that the
reserved rights doctrine should apply in riparian states. There is evi-
dence that the attorneys for the government in kfinter.v felt that what
was reserved to the government was simply a riparian right. " ' This sec-
3$. Courts hase alho, ed Congress to exercie its commerce power oe r non.1e,,gablc tribula-
tes of navigable waterwAs. and oer rivers actuall, na6igable in their natural ,tate. Although
pr sentl% incapable of use for commerce See C Mt Y S & A "r.sAt( I.. .upra note 5. At 22o
.. cenrallr Economy Light & Povkcr Cu v. Uirted States. 256 U S 11. 123 0921). C" I )t,-
,it T"'. KA.\r'PI. & P. , kit.% N.S'(in oA avtqabiitt and i 1 ' ws. in PROM t~ R t i 404..-1111 1 1'074
P1 The Modern Commerce Clau c doctrie permits Congress to regulate .n% tctj' it% A hich
allects interstate commerce alone or in the aggregate. This has meant that Congrcss ha% poscr
tinder the commcrce clause io regulate nearly all aspects of the interrelated American economs
For ceneral discussions of the Supreme Court's development of this doctrine. ,ee Stern. 1he ( ,mi.
m'rc" ('aure and the NuitnaIA'rvnom r io€..4 (pts I & 2). 59 IlAK,. I. Ri 6145. X'3 1194t6). I,
TRim. Astil RIic' COstrtititNi.t LAw §§ 5.4-5 6 (1978)
Since Gibbons v. Ogden. 22 LU S (Wheat I (11824). the broadet constructions 01 this pos er
hase been given in Wickard % Filburn. 317 U.S I I I j 42ltupholding regulation ol ssheat eromn
solel , for home consumption on the grounds that in the aggregate this class of .tciis its could elfect
the interstate market), and in Perez v United States. 402 U.S 146 (1971) I(ongress can crinial-
i.c a loanshark's activitics Aithout demonstrating an% interstatc neusi
40 Another line of commerce clause cases has authorized Congre.s to regulate intertlitt
commerce for reasons unrelated to navigation or commerec For exanple. Congrcs h.t% attt.ked
at.tivittcs disfavored for noncommercial rea.ons by imposing "'protectss c conditions. on the pri% i.
lege of engaging in commerce See L. TRib .. rupra note 39. at 5-6 Landmark catsws in this area
include Champion v. Ames. INK U.S. 321 (1903) ilegislation banning interstate transportation pf
lottery tickets is constitutional), and United States v. Darbv. 312 U.S Il) t1941) (ongrcss can
prohibit interstate commerce of goods made by employees whose wages and hour% do not compl%
with the Fair Labor Standards Act).
41 U.S CoNsT. art. IV. § 3. cl. 2 ("Congress shall have Power to dispoise of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Propen) belonging to the United
States .
42..See C MiY1.ks & A TARLt( K.sTvpra note 5. at 226. Ior cases rt)ing on the propert,
clause as authorization for invoking the reserved rights doctrine see Arizona s California. 373
U S. 546 (1963) and Cappaert v. United States. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
The property clause is also the basis for federal sale or water generated electric posser it lederal
dams. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authonty. 297 U S. 2N8. 330 ( 1936)
43 In the brief which the government filed before the Supreme Court in Winters % United
States. 207 U S. 564 01908). the attorneys stated that "'the theory of the bill of complaint is
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tion considers how the water needs of government lands would be
served if the federal government was treated as an ordinary riparian.
and concludes that the consequences would be serious enough to the
federal government to justify the application of reserved rights in ripa-
rian states.
A. The AmnounI of Water .4 railable to Federal Reserred Landf t >,der
the Riparian Doctrine
As is the case with all riparian users, the federal government's water
use would have to meet the reasonableness standard. Beyond the gen-
eral reasonableness categories. "  certain factors affect the amount of
water that can be used in specific instances. One factor that can be
instrumental in determining the reasonableness of the use is the social
value of the use itself' The interests of the federal government could
depend on the social value that courts attach to the use of water on
reserved lands. If the courts consistently gave the federal government
complete discretion and held that any water use on federal reservation.,
was necessarily of great social value, the interests of the federal govern-
ment would be well protected. However. the social value standard 1N
highly flexible, and courts have held widely differing views on the -No-
cial values of various uses.4" Thus. the courts could be expected to
view the social value of sonic water uses made on federal lands as in-
ferior to some private uses.
If the federal government was treated as an ordinary riparian. it
would also be forced to share water pro rata with other riparians whose
uses were of' equivalent or greater social value. This would mean that
in certain circumstances the federal government would not be able to
have the amount of water it desired, even for uses which the state
thait the dot.trine ,'I riparian right. preails in Montana." Brief for Dcl ndant it 12 . '.,a...
Kie.hel & (,reen. Riparian Rt,,'his Reit.stred Legal Basii./ fr Federal/ Intteahn ih mu Riahlt. I h
N%I Rito Ri is J MY 1(1061
I'he briel also quoted cxtcn.ivcl, from Justace Brewer's decision in United State.% v. Rio (Grandc
Dam and Irrigation (o. 174 U S 690 t 18$9 . -. hich argued that the right reserved to the Unoted
State's was a riparian right. Justice Brever further stated that the state could not desiro, the right
of the federal government to the continued flow off its riparian waters as necessary for the becrii-
cial use of goernment property. Id at 703-04
44 Ye'su pra notes 21-26 and accompan)ng tegt
45 Rist %I .i ., i ot TouTs § 8.53 comments c. d. e ( 1939).
4r) 5 R Ps uv.i i t. tupra note 3. § 713. at 369-70. If cases always involved clearcut etremes.
such as use by . hospital competing with use for an illegal still. couns would probably all agree on
the l '.iluc of conflicting uses Id. But ca.ses are rarely so simple. and courts often disagree
In Pcnn-.sI,,nii. for ,tample. the social value of coal mining has been held to be of greater ocial
v.luc than ,utcr usc for domestic purposes. Pcnnsslvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson. 133 Pa 12t,. 1 '
A 453 t IX,)th The majority of couns would reject this assessment of the competing social saluc%
.See. e.g . Stimford Eitr Mfg Co v. Stamford Rolling Mills. 101 Conn 31U. 125 A. t023 (1924).
Parker %. American Woolen Co. 195 Mas 591. It N E. 468 19)7).
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courts viewed as having great social value.4'
B. The Federal Government as an Ordinarr Riparian-The Con/icts
Requiring the federal government to comply with state water law in
riparian states would not cause some of the problems which compli-
ance with state water law would cause in appropriation states. Most
importantly. the federal government would not have to worry about
acquiring advantageous early priority dates vis-a-vis state determined
priorities." This is because all riparian landowners on a watercourse
have equal rights respecting the use of water, regardless of the date on
which they acquired the land or first made use of the water.4"
A second fundamental conflict that would not arise involves the issue
of quantity. The quantity of water included within an appropriative
right is limited. ° while federal reserved rights involve an indefinite
quantity of water" thus creating a problem when these two systems are
combined. By contrast, federal needs could arguably be satisfied by
riparian law since quantity is determined by the flexible reasonableness
standard.' 2
In spite of the above indications that the water needs of federal lands
could be adequately met by the riparian doctrine, there is reason to
believe that water rights of federally reserved lands could be severely
47 Kir example. irrigation is held to be a use of great social value in riparian states Vee.
eg . l)oremus v Cit,. of Paterson. 65 N.J. Eq 711, 55 A. 304 (1903): Ulbricht %. Eufaula Wter
Co. 86 Ala 587. 6 So 78 (1889). Gillett v. Johnson. 30 Conn 180 (1861): Blanchard v Baker. 8
Me 253 11832) Yet the amount of water available to irrigate Indian reservations could be va,,tls
different in an appropration state than in a riparian state. Since all riparian. washing to irrigaie
would share the supply on the basis of parity. the quantity of water available to the Indian %,ould
shrink as more parcels of land along the river. riparian to the reser'ation, were patented out to
private ownership See Meyers. Supra note II. at 68.
48 NATIoN'S LAND. .rupra note 19. at 144. In prior appropriation states. adminisiratise bod-
ies determine the rights of claimants to water. See 5 R. Powi.LL. supra note 3. § 734. J CRffis T.
supra note I. at 300 In times of shortage. the nghts of claimants depend on the dates when their
respective rights were acquired. Each appropriator is entitled to receive his or her full approprna-
tion of water before appropiators with later priorities become entitled to an' water at all Id
49. Seegeneralir C. MEI.ERS & A. TALOK..mupra note 5. at 52: J. CRititiI t. .upra note I. at
299
50. Two factors limit the quantity of water that can be appropriated. The first is the require-
ment that a maximum quantity be stated in both the permit application and the permit its'elf See
5 R POw1I.L.supra note 3. § 735. at 451. Second. the appropriator can take only the quantity of
water first appropriated. with the exception that amounts that are both within the scope of the
original intent and used within a reasonable timc may also be included. See. e.g.. Ilaight v. Cos-
tanich. 184 Cal. 426. 194 P. 26 (1920): Becker v. Marble Creek Irrigation Co.. 15 Utah 225. 49 P.
892 (1897). For other restrictions which limit the amount of appropriations in some states.. see 5
R. POWELL supra note 3. § 735.
51. See NATION's LAND. supra note 19. at 142.
52. Factors which courts in riparian states have used to determine the reasonableness of the
quantity used include: (1) the size of the riparian land fronting on the stream: (2) the size of the
stream, and (3) the number and kinds of users on the stream. C. MI:Yi:ts & A. TARI.tx. X. supra
note 5. at 56.
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endangered if the federal government was treated as an ordinary ripa-
rian. Perhaps the foremost concern is that some important federal
water uses, such as recreation or sustaining fish and wildlife, have low
preferences vis-a-vis other uses recognized by state law."
A second concern is that no riparian user can use to the extent of
depriving other riparians of an equal opportunity to use.54 Thus, if the
federal lands needed an amount of water so great that use by other
riparians would be encumbered or prevented, the needs of the federal
government could not be fully satisfied.
Finally, acceptance of a state's riparian laws for a number of years
could be interpreted as a waiver of a claim for the use of a greater
amount of water than that recognized by a state." Therefore, if the
government was not awarded the water it needed under riparian law, it
could be barred from ever exercising its reserved rights.
To date. few federal rights have been adjudicated under the reserved
rights doctrine.56 This could soon change drastically. Since the,4rizona
decision. some federal agencies have indicated that they will rely on
reserved rights rather than complying with state water laws.' and other
federal agencies could follow suit.:" Most of the current concern re-
lates to potential problems rather than current controversies. However.
the future impact on riparian users of the exercising of reserved rights
could be major and should not be ignored.5
I11. MAKING RIPARIAN RIGHTS AND
RESERVED RIGHTS COMPATIBLE
In light of the inadequate treatment that the federal government
could receive under the water laws of riparian states, the reserved rights
doctrine should be applied in states adhering to a riparian rights sys-
53 N,to ';s LANi). upra note 19. at 146. See genera/l Warner. iederal Reserred ii'aler
Rt ,ht and their Relarinsxhip to .4ppropnalire Rights in the iestern States. 15 Rot kY NI r.-. NI,%
L 1l.%1 399.410-11 (1969).
54 RiSTATI.MI.STi- TORTS. ch. 41 (1939). This is a corollarN of the rule that all rapa ran.
have equal rights to the use of water. ,See J. CRtiBBT. supra note I. at 299.
55. This is a vanation of the argument that acquisitton of a state appropriative right by the
federal government has the effect of waiving reservation rights to additional water. N ti,,.
LAMt). supra note 19. at 144.
56. See Corker. F1-deral-State Relations in Water Rights .4djudcation and Addmmn.straton. 17
Rot KY MTN. M.. L. INsT. 579. 584 (1972).
57. Two of these agencies are the Forest Service and the military departments. See N % i ao.s
LA.tD. supra note 19. at 144.
5X. For example. the policy of the National Park Service is still one ofcompliance with state
lws. but whether this will continue is uncertain. Id
The state laws that the federal agencies have decided not to follow are the law.% of appropriatimn
5tates. However. if these agencies could successfully resist enforcement of the water laws in appro-
priation states, it follows that they could do likewise in riparian states.
59. See NATI O s LAND. supra note 19. at 144.
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tern. Federal water rights on reserved lands should be determined by
the reserved rights doctrine rather than by state law. However. a
number of issues will have to be resolved in order to make these two
systems compatible. This section identifies three of these issues' and
offers proposals for their resoluion.
A. The Problem of Quantication
The first problem in joining the riparian doctrine and the reserved
rights doctrine into one coherent system of water law is the need to
quantify federal reserved rights. The present uncertainty discourages
the development of industry, agriculture, and other uses by riparian
claimants."' In addition, this uncertainty impedes future planning and
development."
The National Water Commission"3 has recommended that the
amounts of water required for presently reserved lands be formally es-
tablished and that future reservations be required to quantify their
water requirements at the time of their reservation." To achieve this
objective, a standard will have to be established. Governmental bodies
must determine whether reserved water should be available only for
the uses contemplated at the time of the reservation'" for the present
60 To manor isues involving reserved rights that would al.so have to be rcsolsd arc
-A hethcr these right% are transferable by sale or otherwise. and whether the reserved right can
change it the use changes. The la:..cr in Arizona v California suggestcd that nothing in his
decree forbade the transfer of reserved water separate from land. Master's Report. wprsr note I I.
at 265-66 Iiowever. the Supreme Court has failed to addresn the transferability issue .V e s-
cr%. nipr note II. at 7l
The change of use issue was addressed in United States v. New Mexico. 438 U.S. 696 ( 1978).
wkhich held that water ma) be resrcned onl. to the extent necessary to accomplish the original
purpose of the land withdra%,al ld at 71K No additional %%ater is reserved if the government
later expand!, the use of the withdrawn land Id at 713 See a. o notes 65-72 invrt1 and accompa-
n ing test
6 I Note. 4 Proposalfipr the QuantiPcatcwn tR'e.e'rred Indian If aWr Rt. hir. 74 Cmt t'-%% I.
Ri v 1299. 13(4 t 19741 See a/ro 5 R Pow i t I. iupre note 3. § 723.1. at 412.9.
t2 Id Ser a/jo NATito%'S LAMD. supra note I9. at 144. Investors are unwilling to risk mones
[or deelopmcnt without assurance that sull.icient water will be available to meet the develop-
ment's needs
The Potential scope of this problem is arguablN greater in states adhering to the riparian dt-
trine than in prior appropriation states. In the latter. onl., subsequent claimants under state la,
risk losing their water rights in reserved federal lands with earlier priority dates. Under riparian
law, all users are equal. regardless of uhen the acquired title to the riparian land or first made
use of the water Yee 5 R. POWULL..rupra note 3. § 711. Thus,. in riparian states the rights of all
usrs of the water source %ould be affccted by fu.urc exercise of the reserved water right.
63 The National Water Commission was created by Congress in 1969. Pub. L. No. 90-515,
X2 Stat 868 (1969). The purpose of the Commission was to study major national water problems
and make policy rccomiiendations relative to public land policy. The Commission made its rec-
omnicndations in the report. NA^tiONs' LA.t. supra note 19.
64 NATIO.%'s LA,,). rupra note 19. at 146-47.
65 This standard was applied in Arizona v California. 373 U.S. 546 (1963) The %aster'.%
standard for fixing the quantity of water reserved for the Indians on the rcscrvation was irrigable
acreage This finding was justified by the purpose of creating the Indian rcsrvation which was to
11
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needs of the reservation. " or for any new uses which may develop."'
The standard suggested by this article is the contemplated use standard.
This standard is the current favorite of the Supreme Court. " and it is
most favorable to the interests of riparians whose water is taken by
government reservations.6"
The federal government should not be forced to quantify its claims
immediately or for all time. since this would pressure federal officials
into inflating claims. "" Uncertainty and panic can be best avoided if a
procedure is developed for the federal government to revise its reserved
water needs on a periodic basis. The pertinent recommendation of the
National Land Commission"' and the system currently used by the
teach the Indians to live in a stable, agricultural society rather than a nomadic one. This theoreti-
cally would prepare them for life in a white dominated societv. Mast-r's Report. supra note l1. at
265-66. The .4r,:ana Court declared that the **contemplated uses' standard should also be applied
to other federall) reserned lands such as national forests and recreation areas. 373 U.S. at 601
Furthermore. the Court specifically rejected the argument that the amount of water re.served be
determined b- future needs which could develop Id.
The contemplated uses standard was also the basis for the Court*s decision in L'ntred Szaies,
.Ve% .tle it'o
66. This standard mas ha-,e been the basis for the decision in Winters v. United States. 2(17
U S 5(A (1901C). The ;finleri court sustained a decree awarding the Indians 5.(XX) miners' inches.
giving no explanation how this figure was reached. The most likely theory is that this was simpl,
the amount that the Indians were using at the time. 207 U.S. at 577.
Some commentators view the present needs standard as the most practical one to be used lor
Indian reservations. These commentators feel that with more Indians leaving the re.ervations.
future needs are not ikeI io increase. See. eg.. Note. supra note 61. at 1313-14. For cases in
support of this ,,ew. see. e.9 . United States v Ahtanum Irrigation Dist.. 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir
19561. cert. dented. 352 U S 988 1957 ). United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist.. 104 F.2d
334 (9th Cir. 19391
The strongest argument against this position is that the Indians* present water requirement. are
anificially low. for many reasons. including past inadequate representation by the government of
Indian interests, and interagency conflicts. See Note. supra note 61. at 1305"09.
67 United States v Conrad Inv Co. 156 F. 123 (C.C.D. Mont. 1907). q/d. 161 F. S29 19th
Cir 198). decided immediatcl after Hiniers. measured the amount reserved for Indian reserva-
tins in terms of present and future needs. The amount presently allowable was fixed, and the
decree was left open for modifications as needs increased. While ideal for the Indians. this ar-
rangement causes great uncertainty among other users in the watershed. Meyers. supra note I!. at
70
Commentators have argued that since the purpose of Indian reservations is to change the In-
dian's way of life to fit in with the white dominated society. the reserved water uses must be
flexible. For example. the Indian's reservations should be kept in step with the general decline of
agriculture in the western states and the corresponding increase of tourist and municipal uses. Yee
Note.-mpra note 61. at 1316. Comment. Aederal Rererred Righis in IWater." The Problem af'Quant,.
firatin. 9 Ti.xAs Tt.t it. L. Ri-v. 89. 103-04 (1977).
68. See the discussion of nmted Siates . e%" Me.rico. supra notes 32-33 and accompanying
text.
69. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
70. Comment. supra note 67. at 108.
71. The Commission recommended legislation to:
Provide a reasonable peiod of time within which federal land agencies must ascertain and
give public notice of their projected water requirements for the next 40 years for reserved
areas. and forbid the assertion of a reservation claim for any quantity or use not included
within such public notice
12
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Forest Service7 2 could be used as models in formulating this procedure.
Another more technical problem involved in quantifying federal
claims is determining when the reserveJ rights should be measured.
For example. if irrigable acreage is the standard to quantify the water
rights reserved for Indian reservations, the date on which the amount
of irrigable acreage is measured could prove crucial. Due to modern
technology, much more land can be irrigated today than was possible
when most reservations were created."
A third question is which governmental bodies should supervise and
enforce the quantification of the federal government's claims in re-
served waters. Enforcement should be on the federal level in order to
insure uniformity and to avoid resolution in state forums which are
unreceptive to federal claims.74 Both the Congress and the courts have
been unable in the past to create a comrehensive policy for resolving
reserved rights with state water laws. 5 However, as the National
Water Commission and commentators h.--ve concluded, the uncertainty
of the reserved rights doctrine can bcit be dispelled by congressional
legislation. '
Finally. a procedure for resolving conflicts which might occur in the
process of quantification must be defined. The National Water Com-
mission has suggested that this function be performed either by the
courts or by administrative agencies." While judicial attempts to deal
with the reserved rights problem have not met with success in the
N t)%',, L %t). supra note 19. at 147.
72 The Forest Service manual now requires that the Forest Service annuallh report it%
claims for current and foreseeable water requirements to state water officials. The ser'ice is to u.e
iauttion in claiming reserved rights in water currently being used by private individuals in comph-
antce uth state water laws. U.S. Di.PT. oF AoRICULrtIRL F.t-sr Si RVicit M.s%.tIAI. TiIt I
25X) -WA.Ii R-ti.i) MA%(,it s. 7 §§ 2541. 2543 11974).
73 For intance. the extent of irrigation has been physically increased with modern pump%,
and ,prinkler s sstems Also. new cquipment is capable of tilling soil formerly not considered
.arable Vee' Price v Weatherford. Indian Water Rights in Theorti and Prat'etri-" t-flq'tp i flEprience
in the Ctlarad Rver Ba.rin. 40 Lkw & CONT-..IP. PROaSS. 97. 106-07 (1976).
74. See suspra note 53 and accompanying text.
75 l.egislative proposals that Congress clarify the reservation doctrine have been the subject
ol man% recent bills. but Congress has been unable to take any action. See. e'.g.. the .8lo.t.i Bhll. S
21. 92d Cong.. Ist Sess. (1971): the Ilosmer Bill. 1I.R. 2312. 92d Cong.. Ist Sess. (1971). and the
A'uchel Bill. S. 1636. 89th Cong.. Ist Scss. (1965). The first two are verbatim reiterations of the
KAuchel Bill. %hich i. it lf a moderate version of the Barret Bill. S. 863. X4th Cong.. 2d Sess.
1956) For an excellent discussion of attempts to pass legislation prior to 1966. see Morreale.
flederal-State Con/lits Over W;rstern Wat~es--A Decade of/4itienpied "Clarjfring Leg.rlation. - 20
Rtti.ks L. Ri v. 423 (1966).
Similarly. the courts have faced the reserved rights issue repeatedly. but have never come forth
, th a final comprehensive doctrine. See rnpra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
76. NA71ioN's LAti. supra note 19. at 144: Meyers. .upra note II. at 73.
77. The Commission recommends legislation to "establish a procedure for administrati.e or
judicial determination of the reasonableness of the quantity claimed, or the validity of the pro-
i ,ed use under present law.* NATIOS's LAND. supra note 19. at 144.
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past. "' this could change if the courts had some comprehensive legisla-
tion to follow. Both Congress and the courts have demonstrated a de-
sire to quantify reserved rights. Continued determination combined
with encouragement from commentators" ' and governmental officials
can bring about the realization of a workable quantification procedure.
B. The Problem of Compensation
There is fear among water users in riparian states that if reserved
rights were enforced, vested riparian rights would be taken without
compensation. There is little question that the federal government has
the power to take riparian rights without compensating the displaced
riparians. The power is derived from the navigation servitude, as justi-
fied by the commerce clause.80 The possibility that such takings could
occur is the source of much uncertainty and anxiety and is viewed as
the principal vice of the reserved rights doctrine in the eyes of riparian
users.
81
This article adopts the National Water Commission's recommenda-
tion that "'as a matter of fairness and equity. it is appropriate to com-
pensate holders of vested state water rights whose uses are curtailed
through federal reliance on the implied reservation doctrine."' 2 This
could be done either for all riparian users or for all riparian users
whose water rights had vested before they had notice of the existence of
the implied reserved right.8 3
Compensation is desirable for three reasons. First. it would elimi-
nate a great problem in resolving the riparian rights doctrine with the
reserved rights doctrine. Second. the costs to the government would be
relatively low and could be borne by federal taxpayers rather than the
affected individual users." Finally. Congress has traditionally com-
pensated holders of vested state water rights when their usage is inter-
fered with by authorized federal projects, such as the Reclamation Act
of 1902"5 and the Federal Power Act of 1920.8"  In the words of the
National Water Commission, there is "no reason for a different policy
78 Id.
79 Id
80 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
81 NATION's LAND. supra note 19. at 149.
82. Id
83. The National water Commission suggested that appropriators whose interest had ve.ted
prior to the 4nzona decision should be compensated since prior to this decision no water user
could have been on actual or constructive notice of the government's reserved right. Id In apply-
irg this notice concept to riparian users, the date of the .4ri:ona decision is probably not an appro-
priate date of constructive notice, since the Court did not expressly state that the reserved rights
doctrine would apply in riparian states.
84. NATION'S LAN-D. supra note 19. at 149.
85. 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-375 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
86. 16 id. §§ 791-825 (1982).
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where public land programs are involved. "' s
C. How the Riparian Doctrine and the Resered Rights Doctrine
Would Limit Each Other
The reserved rights doctrine and the riparian doctrine would con-
tinue as independent systems for determining water rights. However.
the fact that they would be applied in the same states would mean that
each would have to make certain concessions to the other. A number
of these concessions are discussed above. Additional policies would
have to be made with respect to how these two doctrines would limit
each other.
As an independent system. reserved rights would not be limited by
the riparian rule that water use by one cannot significantly diminish the
quantity or quality of water available to another." The possibility of
depriving riparians of water would be less troublesome due to the fact
that affected riparians would be compensated for the taking of their
water rights. The quantities reserved would be narrowly confined to
the purpose served by the withdrawal, " meaning that the possibility of
depriving riparian users would be minimized. If water should be
needed for reserved lands in excess of the quantity reserved, the federal
government could seek to satisfy this need by submitting to the state's
riparian laws. This policy has recently been suggested by the Supreme
Cou rt."
IV. CONCLUSION
The reserved rights doctrine and the riparian rights doctrine have not
yet met in a direct confrontation. However, there is reason to believe
that someday such a conflict will occur. It is. therefore. desirable to
examine the compatibility of these two doctrines before a crisis situa-
tion develops. This article has proposed that the reserved rights doc-
trine should be applied in riparian states. While problems would
inevitably arise in making these two doctrines compatible. these
problems can be resolved with the help of Congress and the courts.
The result would be a coherent and beneficial water policy for the east-
ern half of the United States.
87. NATio.'s LAN D. Supra note 19. at 148.
I8S. Id at 149.
X9. See spra notes 61-79 and accompanying text. See also ,Mevers. .rupra note II. at 73
90. In th eNew.teAtco decision, the Court suggested that when rescrvcd water ns una.ialable.
federal agencies must abide by state water law and acquire water rights in the same wa) as any
other public or private appropriator. 438 U.S. at 701-03
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